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The dividend debate between agency cost theory and information signaling theory 
indicates opposite explanations of the relationship between dividend payout and cash 
flow volatility.  
 
According to information signaling theory, managers will lower the dividend in case 
the firm can not distribute the announced amount when the future cash flow is 
uncertain. Managers will choose a dividend policy where announced dividend is less 
than expected income in order to avoid the potential “wealth penalties”1. The more 
volatile future cash flow means higher risk related to the future earning. Thus, the 
information signaling theory predicts that dividend payout should be lower when 
future cash flows are more volatile. 
 
Grounded in the agency cost theory, an increase in dividends will result in a reduction 
in free cash flow which will generate agency costs. The larger the cash flow variance, 
the greater potential agency costs will exist. Higher dividend payout can be used 
against non-value maximizing investments for firms with greater cash flow 
uncertainty. Thus, agency cost theory predicts that firms with more volatile cash flows 
would distribute a greater proportion of their cash flows as dividends.  
 
This empirical study tests the two theories above, with a sample of 135 public equity 
US REIT firms from 1985 to 2003. It explores the role of expected cash flow 
volatility as a determinant of dividend policy for REIT industry. 
                                                        
1 A stock price drop is usually associated with cutting dividends, which is also known as “wealth 
penalty” for shareholders.  
vi 
 
The study constructs both excess dividend and total dividend panel regression models, 
which are based on the model from Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1998) and the 
concept of excess dividend equation proposed by in Lu and Shen (2003). Our results 
show strong evidence that REIT firms pay out substantial excess dividends to avoid 
agency problem when the future cash flows are volatile. The information signaling 
theory plays a relatively minor role in REIT firms’ dividend policy.   
 
The statutory distribution of dividend is one special characteristic of REIT industry. 
This ratio was reduced from 95% to 90% in 2001. Our sample shows that most REIT 
firms were reluctant to reduce the dividend payout in spite of this regulation change. 
In addition, REIT firms also maintained the dividend payouts even when they have 
lower earnings. This dividend maintenance behavior over 2001 may provide a 
significant signal to the market. However, the results from the probit analysis do not 
show that the dividend changes in 2001 can be considered as accurate signals for 
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1.1 Background  
 
Dividends are payments made to the firm’s shareholders, which are based on the 
firm’s underlying earnings. The determination of the proportion of profits 2 
periodically paid out to shareholders is called “dividend policy”. Firms usually follow 
deliberate dividend payout strategies that can be driven by several goals. This raises 
several interesting questions: how do the firms choose their dividend policies? What 
is the optimal proportion of the earning to be paid out as cash dividend? These 
questions are considered as a puzzle related to the dividend policy determination 
process.  
 
Researchers have proposed a number of explanations about this dividend puzzle. A 
substantial theoretical literature, including Bhattacharya (1979), Kose and Joseph 
(1985), Miller and Rock (1985), indicates that dividend payout is designed to reveal 
future earnings’ prospects to the outside shareholders. However, recent results are 
more mixed, because the firms’ current dividend payouts do not actually reflect the 
changes of firms’ future earnings. Agency problems between corporate insiders 
(managers) and outside shareholders are greatly related to the dividend policies 
(Easterbrook 1984, Jensen1986, Myers 1998).   
 
                                                        




Cash flow3 is usually considered as an important indicator of a firm's financial health. 
The high volatility of cash flow is associated with greater market risks and higher 
operation costs. The cash flow volatility not only increases the likelihood that a firm 
will need to access capital markets, it also increases the costs of doing so. The 
manager’s dividend policy should consider the expected cash flow and its volatility, 
which indicate the ability of a firm to pay out current or future dividends. Two 
theories have been advocated to explain the relationship between expected cash flow 
volatility and dividend payout: information signaling theory and agency cost theory.  
 
There is usually a discrete stock price drop or shareholder “wealth penalty” associated 
with cutting dividends. Under the information signaling theory, managers will choose 
a dividend policy where announced dividends are less than expected income in order 
to avoid the penalty. This policy allows managers to maintain announced dividends 
even if subsequent cash flows are lower than anticipation. Thus, the information 
signaling theory predicts that dividend payout should be lower when future cash flow 
is more volatile. 
 
The agency cost theory suggests that an increase in dividends will result in a reduction 
in free cash flow thus multiplying agency cost. The larger the cash flow variance, the 
greater the potential agency costs and the more reliance on dividend distribution to 
avoid this agency cost. The dividend payout to guard against non-value maximizing 
investments should be greatest for the firms with highest cash flow uncertainty. Thus 
the agency cost theory predicts that firms with more volatile cash flows would pay out 
a greater proportion of their cash flows as dividends. Empirical evidence supporting 
                                                        
3 Cash Flow equals to cash receipts minus cash payments over a given period of time. More detailed 
discussion about cash flow will be included in Chapter 2.  
Chapter 2 
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the agency cost explanations can be found from Rozeff (1982), Dempsey and Laber 
(1992), and Wang, Erickson and Gau (1993). 
 
The information signaling theory and agency cost theory provide contrasting 
explanations between dividend payout and future cash flow volatility. According to 
information signaling theory, the managers will lower the dividend in case the firm 
can not distribute the announced amount when the future cash flow is uncertain. 
While the agency cost theory supports that the greater dividend payout can be used 
against non-value maximizing investments for firms with greater cash flow 
uncertainty. 
 
Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) is a corporation or trust which uses the pooled 
capital of many investors to purchase and manage income property (equity REIT) 
and/or mortgage loans (mortgage REIT). It is an organization similar to an investment 
company in some respects but concentrating its holdings in real estate investments. 
More and more researches have been done about the dividend policy in REIT industry. 
The debate between the information signaling theory and agency cost theory has 
continuously been heated in this area.   
 
In this study, the relationship between dividend policy and cash flow volatility will be 
examined by employing a sample from REITs industry. Two important financial 
variables, dividend and cash flow, will be jointly analyzed in one theoretical 
framework regarding to the dividend debate. The special characteristics4 in REITs 
industry offer several benefits to overcome some of the obstacles that complicate 
                                                        
4 The details will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 2 
4 
previous studies in the dividend policy. REIT industry is considered as a good testing 
ground for the dividend policy, which can contribute5 to further understandings about 
different factors related to the dividend policy.  
 
This study constructs both excess dividend and total dividend panel regression models, 
which are based on the model from Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1998) and the 
concept of excess dividend equation proposed by in Lu and Shen (2003). Our results 
show strong evidence that REIT firms pay out substantial excess dividends to avoid 
agency problem when the future cash flows are volatile. The information signaling 
theory plays a relatively minor role in REITs’ dividend policy. In addition, a group of 
probit models has been employed and results show that the dividend changes in 2001 
can not be considered as accurate signals for future dividend or cash flow changes. 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
 
There are two main objectives in this study: firstly, it investigates the role of expected 
cash flow and its volatility as determinants of dividend policy. Which theory 
dominates the explanations for dividend payout behaviors? Secondly, it focuses on the 
extent to which the different factors associated with cash flow volatility will influence 
dividend policy.     
 
1.3 Data Sample 
 
The data in this study is collected from Compustat database and CRSP (Centre for 
                                                        
5 The contributions of this study will be summarized in Chapter 7.   
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Research in Security Prices). The sample contains a sample of 135 public equity US 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) from 1985 to 2003. The database focuses on 
equity REITs and excludes all mortgage REITs and hybrid REITs due to their 
different business characteristics and asset structure. REITs that are not traded on the 
NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ are also excluded from our sample.  
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
 
This study considers excess dividend as a better measurement for REITs’ dividend 
policy. Based on Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1998) and Lu and Shen (2003), an 
excess dividend panel regression model is constructed to test the relationship between 
dividend payout and cash flow volatility. Three kinds of Panel regressions are 
included in the empirical process: OLS, fixed effect and random effect. In addition to 
the variables associated with cash flow volatility, firm growth rate and return rate are 
also discussed in the regression models.  
 
The total dividend regression model is conducted as a robust test for excess dividend 
regression model. Covering the same firm and same time period, the comparison 
between excess dividend payout and total dividend payout will help the investors have 
a better understanding of REITs’ dividend payout strategies and make a more accurate 
expectation of future cash flow volume and its volatility.  
 
The statutory distribution in REIT dividend was reduced from 95% to 90% in 2001. 
However, most of REITs in our sample were reluctant to reduce the dividend payouts 
in spite of the regulation change or lower earnings. This dividend maintenance 
Chapter 2 
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behavior in 2001 provided a significant signal to the market. A probit analysis is 
employed to explore the relationship between the current/future dividend changes and 
cash flow changes.  
 
1.5 Hypotheses of Study 
 
According to the research objectives and methodology, following hypotheses are 
formulated in this study:  
 
(1) According to information signaling theory, the managers will lower the excess 
dividend payouts when the future cash flow is uncertain. If the future earning is 
unexpected low, the REITs may not distribute the announced amount of dividend 
and a “wealth penalty” may happen. As a result, the higher future cash flow 
volatility, the fewer dividends will be paid out.  
(2) According to the agency cost theory, greater excess dividend payout can be used 
against non-value maximizing investments for firms with greater cash flow 
uncertainty in the future. The higher future cash flow volatility, the more 
dividends will be distributed to shareholders.  
 
These two theories give totally opposite predictions on the relationship between 
dividend payout and future cash flow volatility.    
 
1.6 Organization of Study 
 




Chapter 1 provides an introduction comprising the background, objectives, data 
sample, methodology and main hypotheses of this study. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a brief review of the dividend debate between information 
signaling theory and agency cost theory. 
 
Chapter 3 begins with an introduction about the characteristics of REITs. The 
following is a review of literature on the divided debate in REITs industry. Then the 
reasons to choose excess dividend as a better measurement are discussed. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the research methodology: excess dividend regression, total 
dividend regression and other influences including the influences from regulation 
changes.   
 
Chapter 5 presents a detailed description of the dataset used in this study. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the empirical results and makes a discussion based on them.  
 
Chapter 7 summarizes the findings from the empirical analysis, gets main conclusions 
and points the contributions of this study. Finally, it also indicates important directions 







Literature Review  
 
This chapter focuses on the debate on the relationship between cash flow volatility 
and dividend policy in a general financial concept. A literature review shows that 
information signaling theory and agency cost theory have given opposite explanations 
on this topic. The first part will review the important basic concepts of cash flow 
volatility and dividend payout. The following parts seek to summarize the main 
findings on the relationship between cash flows and dividends, which will show us a 
picture of the dividend debate based on different theories6.  
 
2.1 Cash Flow Volatility and Dividend Payout 
 
Cash flow equals cash receipts minus cash payments over a given period of time. We 
can also calculate cash flow, equivalently, by adding amounts charged off for 
depreciation, depletion, and amortization to net profit.7 A complete statement of cash 
flows includes three parts: cash flow from operation (CFO), cash flow from investing 
activities (CFI) and cash flow form financing activities (CFF). The analysis on cash 
flows provides information not only about the cash receipts and cash payments during 
an accounting period, but also about the firm’s operating, investing, and financing 
activities. Therefore, cash flow is usually considered as a measurement of a firm's 
financial health.  
                                                        
6 This chapter focuses on the literature review of the dividend debate in general financial area. The literature 
review about REITs will be discussed in details in next chapter. 
 
7 The two ways mentioned about the cash flow calculation are described orderly as “direct way” and 




Volatility measures the change in value of a financial instrument with a specific time 
horizon, and quantifies the risk of the instrument over that time period. The volatility 
of cash flow not only increases the likelihood that a firm will need to access capital 
markets, it also increases the costs of doing so. Therefore, the cash flow volatility in 
the future reflects the potential risk in future operating, investing, and financing 
activities of a firm. 
 
Dividends are a portion of profits distributed by a firm to its shareholders based on the 
firm’s underlying earnings, the type of stock and number of shares owned by the 
shareholders. Dividends are usually paid in cash, though they may also be paid in the 
form of additional shares of stock or other properties. The amount of a dividend 
determined by the inside management of the firm, usually called as “dividend policy”, 
is restricted by the amount of cash owned by the firm. In a real world with taxes and 
transaction costs, the dividends will greatly influence the firm value. There is a 
tradeoff for managers between retained earnings on one hand, and dividend 
distributions to shareholders on the other.     
 
The expected cash flow and its volatility reflect the potential business risk of a firm, 
which also indicate the ability of a firm to pay out dividend. Cash flow and dividend 
should be jointly analyzed in a consolidated framework, as the firm’s management 






2.2 A Dividend Debate Referring to Cash Flow Volatility 
 
How do firms choose their dividend policy? How do managers determine the optimal 
payout ratio? From cash flow’s aspect, two theories have been advocated: information 
signaling theory and agency cost theory. These two theories offer opposite 
explanations about the relationship between expected cash flow volatility and 
dividend payout. 
 
Under the information signaling theory, there is a discrete stock price or shareholder 
wealth “penalty” associated with cutting dividends. In order to avoid these penalties, 
managers will choose a dividend policy where announced dividends are less than 
expected income. Thus, dividend payout should be lower when future cash flows are 
more volatile. 
 
The agency cost theory argues that an increase in dividends will result in a reduction 
in free cash flow8 where the agency problem may exist. The dividend payout 
investments should be greatest for the firms with highest cash flow uncertainty to 
avoid non-value maximizing investment activities. Thus, firms with more volatile 
cash flows would pay out a greater proportion of their cash flows as dividends.  
 
2.3 Information Signaling Theory 
 
A substantial theoretical literature suggests that corporate dividend policy is designed 
                                                        
8 Free cash flow represents the cash that a company is able to generate after laying out the money 
required to maintain or expand the company's asset base. Free cash flow can be a source of 
principal-agent conflict between shareholders and managers, since shareholders would probably want it 




to reveal earnings prospects and other useful related information to investors. Lintner 
(1956) first proposed that dividend changes should convey useful information about 
future earnings. Miller and Mogigliani (1961) advanced this reasoning by proposing 
that the information content of dividends could be valuable to investors when markets 
are incomplete. Miller (1987) also contended that dividend changes disclosed 
information about a firm’s permanent income. Dividend signaling models make the 
more specific predictions that firms raise dividends either prior to earnings increases 
or to reveal that an increase is permanent. Several former papers, including 
Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), and Kose and Joseph (1985), argue that 
managers use dividends to signal the changes of future earnings to investors. 
 
The cash flow volatility is usually considered as a good proxy for the future earning. 
The following papers discuss the relation between dividend distribution and cash flow 
volatilities: Eades (1982), Kale and Noe (1990), and Bradley, Capozza and Seguin 
(1998). All assume either explicitly or implicitly that the managers are perfectly 
aligned with current shareholders. Under this assumption, the market can infer firms’ 
private information from their managers’ actions. However, in reality, the managers 
may not be able to communicate credible signals to the market. Managers in the firms 
that are not effectively monitored may be more likely to maximize their own wealth 
instead of the shareholders’ wealth compared to managers in effectively monitored 
firms.  
 
Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) examine cash flow changes around large 
samples of dividend changes, and argue that dividend increases are not credible 
signals of future performance. They find that dividends are related to past earnings but 
Chapter 2 
12 
not future earnings. Their results seriously challenge information signaling as an 
important component of dividend policy. 
 
Dividend policy can also be evaluated based on how dividends evolve before and 
after large cash flow changes. DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) find that dividend 
changes lag earning changes in a sample of 145 firms that suffer decreased earnings 
after ten straight years of rising earnings. Only in two cases, firms cut dividends 
before the earnings drop. They conclude that managers do not signal the negative 
information with dividends and the small cash obligations associated with increasing 
dividends reduce the reliability of dividends as a signaling mechanism. 
 
2.4 Agency Cost Theory 
 
Agency problem comes from the conflicts of interest among the outside stockholders 
and the inside managers. The incremental costs of having an agent (manager) to make 
decisions for a principal (shareholder) are known as “agency cost”. According to 
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, the management has an incentive to 
maximize the free cash flows at his discretion by distributing minimum dividends. 
The excess cash flow is wasted on value-destroying spending. This suggests a policy 
of encouraging cash-flow payout to minimize inefficient investment spending. The 
dividend payout to shareholders is considered as a disciplinary mechanism, reducing 
the agency cost associated with the free cash flow and overinvestment.  
 
Rozeff (1982) indicates that paying dividends will reduce the resources under 
mangers’ control, and thus make firms issue new securities resulting in capital market 
Chapter 2 
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monitoring, thereby reducing agency costs. Several other studies have also presented 
empirical evidence supporting the agency cost explanation as Dempsey and Laber 
(1992), and Wang, Erickson and Gau (1993). In addition, the evidence also shows that 
those explanations based on agency cost theory are applicable over different 
economic conditions (Dempsey and Laber, 1992). 
 
The dividend policy can also be explained from other aspects in an agency problem 
framework. Myers (1984) advocates the pecking order theory that firms prefer 
retained earnings as their main source of funds for investment9. Therefore a growth 
firm tends to have a lower payout ratio and preserve more cash for expansion. The 
firm will try to restrain itself from the debt also because: first, to avoid any material 
costs of financial distress; and second, to reserve the borrowing power for future 
expansion. Thus, the growth opportunity of a firm will influence the consideration of 
dividend policy, which is also linked to the investment and financing decisions.  
 
Easterbrook (2001) discusses whether dividend distribution is a method of aligning 
managers’ interests with those of investors. He suggests that the monitoring of 
managers in open capital market is available at low cost. Dividend distribution can 
reduce the internal funds and keep firms in the capital market. This can used to 
explain why firms simultaneously pay out dividends and raise new funds in the capital 
market. The internal monitoring costs can be reduced by distributing dividend and 
using external financing.    
 
                                                        
9 Firms prefer the internal funds to external funds, and debt to equity if the external funds are needed. 
The firm will choose a dividend payout ratio which can meet the required rate of return of equity 




Grounded in agency cost theory, substitution concept10 is raised by some researchers. 
Easterbrook’s (1984) rationale of substitution among agency cost control devices 
suggests the agency cost explanations are only valid for firms that are not effectively 
monitored. Noronha, Shome, and Morgan (1996) show that dividends as an agency 
cost control device are effective only for firms with low growth opportunity or 
without the presence of alternative no-dividend monitoring devices. Filbeck and 
Millineaux (1999) also produce evidence consistent with the substitution concept. 
Some researchers connect the substitution hypothesis with the shareholder rights in 
the discussion of dividend policy. La Porta et al (2000) examine dividend policies of 
firms in 33 countries and argue that firms with weak shareholder rights pay dividends 
more generously than do firms with strong shareholder rights. Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) investigate how the market for corporate control (external governance) 
and shareholder activism (internal governance) interact. Agency costs can influence 
dividend payouts on one hand; one the other hand, they are related to the strength of 
internal governance. Therefore, the dividend payouts should be linked to the strength 
of internal governance. Dividends play the role as a substitute for internal governance.   
 
2.5 Summary  
 
This chapter analyses the relationship between dividend payouts and cash flow 
volatility. Cash flow volatility reflects the business risk of a firm and its ability to 
distribute dividends. When managers determine the payout proportion, cash flow and 
its volatility always play important roles. 
 
                                                        




How do cash flows affect the dividend policy? There are two leading theories related 
to this dividend debate: information signaling theory and agency cost theory. The first 
idea argues that dividend policy is designed to reveal earnings prospects and other 
useful related information to investors. The managers will lower the dividend in case 
the firm can not distribute the announced amount when the future cash flow is more 
volatile. While the agency cost theory supports that the greater dividends should be 
paid out for firms with greater cash flow uncertainty against non-value maximizing 
investments. 
 
Main findings about the two theories from literature are summarized in this section. 
This dividend debate related to the cash flow volatility raises many interesting 




The Dividend Debate in REIT Industry 
 
This chapter introduces the characteristics of Real Estate Investment Trust. The 
reasons and advantages to choose REIT data in this study are discussed based on these 
characteristics in this industry. The following part is the literature review about the 
dividend debate in REIT industry. The definition of excess dividend is advocated in 
the third section. This study argues that excess dividend is a better measurement for 
REIT industry compared to total dividend and three main reasons are proposed in the 
discussion.  
 
3.1 REIT: An Interesting Testing Ground for Dividend Policy  
 
The majority of dividend policy literature uses data from a wide variety of industries 
in their investigation. The use of multiple industry firm data may be advantageous in 
testing theory, as different business natures of firms in the sample will provide 
sufficient cross sectional variations. However, the same factor may carry different 
weights in the decision-making process for firms in different industries. It will be 
difficult to distinguish the effects between industry factors and the factors directly 
related to dividend policy. The dividend policy and related important variables will 
vary from industry to industry, because asset risk, asset type and requirement for 
funds (internal or external) also vary by industry (Myers 1984).  In other words, 
wide differences in firms’ business nature will complicate the situation. This study 
chooses a single industry as the sample, which will eliminate the industry effects and 




A Real Estate Investment Trust is a company dedicated to owning, and in most cases, 
operating income-producing real estate, such as apartments, shopping centers, offices 
and warehouses. Some REITs also engage in financing real estate. The U.S. Congress 
created the legislative framework for REITs in 196011 to enable the investing public 
to benefit from investments in large-scale real estate enterprises. REITs are traded on 
major exchanges just like stocks. They provide ongoing dividend along with the 
potential for long-term capital gains through share price appreciation, and can also 
serve as a powerful tool for portfolio balancing and diversification.12 
 
REIT industry is highly regulated. U.S. Internal Revenue Code (IRC) requires REIT 
to distribute 90% of taxable income13. However, 90% or 95% rule is applied to 
earnings after allowable non-cash depreciation expenses have been deducted. The 
calculation of taxable income for REIT is complicated because of the variance of 
depreciation of property asset, which is also a significant non-cash item. Thus, REIT 
managers still have reasonable discretion in the percentage of earning paid out to 
shareholders despite the statutory payout requirement. For some REITs with high 
leverage or with tax loss carryforwards14, the 90% or 95% rule is completely 
non-binding so that zero dividend payouts are observed in our sample. This indicates 
                                                        
11 Real Estate Investment Trust Act of 1960    
The federal law authorized REITs. Its purpose was to allow small investors to pool their investments in 
real estate in order to get the same benefits as might be obtained by direct ownership, while also 
diversifying their risks and obtaining professional management.  
 
12 http://www.investinreits.com  Investor Guide 
 
13 REIT Modernization Act of 1999    
Distribution requirement is effective in 2001. (H.R. 1180) will return the distribution requirement from 
95% to the 90% level that applied to REITs from 1960 to 1980. In our sample, 95% of taxable income 
must be paid out to shareholders during time period from 1985 to 2000, while 90% from 2001 to 2003. 
  




that although REIT has strict regulations about the dividend payouts, actual dividend 
policy is not restricted by the regulations because of large amount of non-cash items 
such as depreciation. Managers still can decide the dividend distribution. The 
differences of dividend payout between REIT industry and other industries are not so 
significant. The discussion about the dividend policy in general financial area is 
applicable in REIT industry.    
 
Researches have also found some interesting behaviors in dividend payouts of REIT 
industry. For the majority of the REITs, the median payout ratio is often larger than 
1.015, which echoes Su, Erickson and Wang (2003)’s observation that “REITs pay out 
more than what is required”. Li and Ooi (2004) find that there is considerable 
variation in the payout ratios of REITs, because the dividends of REITs are sticky 
while the earnings are more volatile.  
 
In the mid-1990s, U.S. REITs experienced rapid growth fueled by available external 
equity and debt financing. There were a number of REIT IPOs and a number of large 
acquisitions by REITs. Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2 show that the numbers and market 
capitalizations of REITs increased fast in the mid-1990s. The dividend policy is 
generally evaluated by examining cash flow changes around large samples of 
dividend changes. So the increasing number of REITs can give us a big sample which 
is more convincing in exploring the role of cash flow volatility as a dividend policy 
determinant. 
                                                        
15 In the sample of this study, average REIT payout ratio is 1.14. Please refer to Table 5-1: Summary of 




Figures 3-1: U.S. REITs Number from 1980 to 2003 
Source: http://www.nareit.com 
 
Figures 3-2: U.S. REITs Capitalization from 1980 to 2003 
Source: http://www.nareit.com 
 
Given these corporate organizational changes together with the REITs’ rapid growth, 
a key question is whether the change of REIT status affects the firm’s performance. 
Recent research demonstrates a strong relationship between dividend policy and 


















































































































operating performance of over-investing firms. Koch and Shenoy (1999) find that 
dividend policy provides more predictive information for over-investing firms than 
for value-maximizing firms. The argument about the REIT status enhances the 
importance of information content when we discuss the REITs’ dividend policy.  
 
Another advantage to test dividend policy in REIT industry is their public and 
transparent structures. Gentry and Mayer (2002) point out that REITs industry can 
supply more accurate account data.  
 
REIT share valuation and accounting data are based on a number of relatively 
transparent factors:16 
 
(1)Net Asset Value Calculation 
Unlike other public companies, many REITs, as well as REIT analysts, perform 
regular (annual and often quarterly) valuations of their company property holdings. 
The value of a REIT’s total assets, minus liabilities, divided by the number of its 
shares outstanding results in what is called the Net Asset Value (NAV) per share of the 
company. Thus, the value of a REIT’s shares is, to a significant degree, based on the 
value of its tangible real estate holdings. 
 
(2)Property Portfolio Enhancements 
The value of a REIT’s property portfolio can frequently be either maintained or 
enhanced through consistent capital expenditures. This is significant because strategic 
property portfolio enhancements help to maintain or increase NAVs and provide the 
                                                        
16 http://www.investinreits.com  Investor Guide 
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basis for price appreciation of a REIT’s shares.  
 
Many factors that can influence the value of a REIT’s property portfolio are easily 
understood, beginning with the obvious economic fundamentals of supply and 
demand that effect valuation. Other considerations may include demographic 
information such as population size, population growth, employment growth and the 
level of overall economic activity. All of these factors, while differing from region to 
region, typically have a direct impact on rents and occupancy rates, which in turn 
drive both projected cash flow and affect property values. 
 
In addition, Funds from Operations (FFO) was defined by NAREIT in 1991. FFO 
adjusts the net income of equity REITs for non-cash charges such as depreciation and 
amortization of rental properties, gains on sales of real estate and extraordinary items. 
Management considers FFO to be a useful financial performance measurement 
because it provides investors with an additional basis to evaluate the performance. 
And it also helps investors evaluate the ability of a REIT to incur and service debt and 
to fund acquisitions and other capital expenditures. FFO was promoted as an 
appropriate measure of performance in REIT industry. Users of the industry's 
financial statements have accepted FFO17 as a starting point from which to analyze 
the historical, as well as prospective profitability and value of firms.  
 
In this study, the dividend policy and cash flow volatility will be examined by 
employing a sample from REIT industry. The special characteristics in REIT industry 
offer several benefits to overcome some of the obstacles that complicate previous 
                                                        
17 The FFO per share (basic / diluted) is reported according to Guidelines for Reporting Performance 
on a per Share Basis. 
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studies in the dividend policy. Based on the discussion above, I summarize the 
reasons why REIT industry is considered as a good and interesting testing ground for 
dividend policy. 
 
(1) Single industry can eliminate the industry effects and highlight the importance of 
firm-specific volatility.  
 
(2) REITs are found usually paid more than required and payout ratios are very 
volatile. Actual dividend policy is not restricted by the statutory distribution 
regulations and REIT managers still can decide the distributions to shareholders. The 
discussion about the dividend policy in general financial area is applicable in REIT 
industry.   
 
(3)REIT industry experienced a rapid growth in mid-1990s, which supplied a larger 
sample for empirical study. In addition, organizational changes of REITs’ structure 
enhance the importance of information content related to dividend policy.  
 
(4) REITs’ public and transparent structure can offer more useful financial data. FFO 
is accepted as an appropriate measure of performance in REIT industry. 
 
3.2 The Dividend Debate between Two Theories in REIT Industry 
 
In the REIT’s literature, more and more researches in dividend policy have been done. 
The debate between the information signaling theory and agency cost theory has 




Some researchers argue that the tax rule requires REITs to pay out 90% of earnings 
and forces the REIT to seek the external financing in open capital market. Under the 
scrutiny form capital market, the agency problems should be very minimal. However, 
Wang, Erickson and Gau (1993) argue that agency cost hypothesis is strongly 
supported by their empirical results. They indicate that equity REIT has higher agency 
costs resulted from imperfect information and therefore has higher payout ratio.  
 
Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1998) examine the link between cash flow volatility 
and dividend payout both theoretically and empirically. Their one period model 
demonstrates that managers rationally pay out lower levels of dividends when the 
future cash flows are more volatile. Their empirical results use a sample of REIT from 
1985-1992 and confirm that payout ratios are lower for firms which have higher 
expected cash flow volatility. This is consistent with information-based explanations 
of dividend policy.  
 
Mooradian and Yang (2001) examine the free cash flow hypothesis by comparing 
firm performance of hotel REITs and non-REIT hotel operating companies from 1993 
to 1999. They argue that REITs should be able to mitigate the agency problem caused 
by free cash flows as a result of the statutory distribution regulation. There are 
statistically significant differences in leverage level, dividend policy and cash flow 
levels in these two types of companies. Their findings clearly show that a firm’s 
performance (the market to book ratio) is negatively related to free cash flow proxies 




Lu and Shen (2003) analyze the yearly dividend paying behavior of the publicly 
traded REITs from 1994 to 2000. They argue that due to large non-cash depreciation 
expenses, REITs retain much more discretion over free cash flows than what is 
interpreted by normal accounting methods. Agency costs arise and “excess dividend” 
is preferred by shareholders for monitoring purpose. They conclude that agency cost 
theory can well explain the REIT dividend policy. In addition, REITs may voluntarily 
select appropriate dividend payouts to solve the agency problems in the absence of the 
government interventions.   
 
Lee and Slawson (2004) consider the extent to which a firm is monitored may affect 
the explanation for dividends, especially for those dividends paid in excess of 
mandatory payout ratio. They obtain different evidence when considering 
no-mandatory dividends and non-dividend monitoring. However their evidence shows 
that agency cost explanations dominate signaling explanations for relatively less 
monitored REITs. 
  
3.3 A Better Measurement for REITs’ Dividend Policy  
 
One of the characteristics for REIT is the highly regulated dividend distribution. 
Under the U.S. IRS rule, REIT should distribute 90% of taxable income (95% before 
REIT Modernization Act of 1999). However, the calculation of taxable income of 
REITs is complicated because of significant non-cash items, such as the variance of 
depreciation of property asset. REIT managers still have reasonable discretion in the 
actual distributions to shareholders despite the statutory payout requirement. Some 
REITs with high leverage or with tax loss carryforwards, the IRS rule is completely 
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non-binding to the dividend policy so that zero dividend payouts are also observed in 
our sample. In addition, the payout ratio for most REITs is often larger than 1.0. Why 
do the REITs prefer to pay out more than what is required? How do the REITs decide 
the excess part beyond the requirement as dividends?  
 
3.3.1 Definition of Excess Dividend  
 
The excess distribution beyond the statutory required part is known as “excess 
dividend”.  In this study, excess dividend ( itED ) is defined as: 
 




where     itD     is dividend per share for current year; 
          itEPS   is earning per share for current year. 
 
This is different from Lu and Shen (2003), in which excess dividend is defined as 
dividend per share minus the earning per share. Excess dividend should be defined as 
the “excess part” after the statutory part (90% or 95% of itEPS ) deducted from the 
total dividend payout. When itEPS  is negative, there is no statutory dividend to be 
paid out. As such, the actual total dividend paid is considered as excess dividend in 
this study when itEPS  is negative. 
   Before 2001 2001and Onward  
0≤itEPS  itD=  itD=  
itED  
0>itEPS  itit EPSD *%95−=  itit EPSD *%90−=  
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3.3.2 Reasons for Excess Dividend  
 
This study considers the excess dividend as a better measurement for the dividend 
policy in REIT industry because of the following reasons:  
 
(1) Under the IRS rule, managers can only decide how much excess dividend to be 
paid out but not the total dividend. In this case, the managers can only use excess 
dividend as a signal indicating the future cash flow’s volume and volatility. 
Meanwhile, the shareholders can only expect the REIT managers to distribute 
more excess dividend to avoid the potential agency cost when the future cash flow 
is highly volatile.  
 
Table 3-2 describes the excess dividend payouts in two time periods according to 
different statutory distribution requirements. 72.80%18 of our observations in our 
sample19 pay out excess dividend, which indicates that excess dividend payout is a 
dominant phenomenon in REIT industry. Thus, it will be useful and reasonable to 










                                                        
18 Table 3-2: 72.80% of the REIT observations in the sample pay out excess dividend  
(63+787+39+254)/ 1570 * 100% =72.80% 
 
19 Our sample contains a subset of 135 US Equity REITs listed in the NAREIT source books in 2003. 
The original data ranges from 1985 to 2003, while availability of individual firm data also depends on 
their respective listing date. REITs that are not traded on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ are also 
excluded from our sample. US REITs company fundamental data are obtained from Standard & Poor’s 
Compustat database. REITs firm share price are gained from CRSP. 
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Table 3-2: Summary of Excess Dividend Payout 
 
 
   before 2001 2001 and onward 
 
  
Pay out dividend  
when EPS < 0 
Payout ratio 
> 0.95   
Pay out dividend  
when EPS < 0 
Payout ratio 
> 0.90   
No. of 
observations 63 787 39 254 
Percentage 5.32% 66.47% 10.10% 65.80% 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
Original Data Source: Compustat database &CRSP database 
Sample: 1570 observations for127 firms 
Period: 1985 – 2003 
 
(2) The calculation of taxable income for REITs is complicated because of the 
significant non-cash items such as property depreciation. FFO is considered as a 
useful financial performance measurement of an equity REIT because FFO 
provides investors with an additional basis to evaluate the performance and ability 
of a REIT to incur and service debt and to fund acquisitions and other capital 
expenditures. In our sample, the median of FFODividend / 20 is 0.62, while the 
median of payout ratio ( EPSDividend / ) is 1.20. This indicates that FFO per 
share is usually much bigger than EPS. REITs’ dividend policy is not constrained 
by the statutory distribution requirement and net income, because REITs usually 
have cash flow beyond earnings to support the excess dividend payouts. The 
analysis on excess dividend can help us exploit further into the dividend policy. 
 
(3) REIT managers also try to smoothen the dividend payout. Table 3-3 shows that in 
102 instances, REITs distribute excess dividends even when their EPS is negative. 
                                                        




For more than half of these 102 observations, their current EPS is worse than that 
of the previous financial year. 52.94%21 of the observations in the sample pay out 
excess dividend when EPS decreases.  
 
Table 3-3: Summary of Excess Dividend Payout when EPS < 0 
 
  before 2001 2001 and onward 
No. of observations 63 39 







No. of observations 29 34 25 14 
Percentage 46.03% 53.97% 64.10% 35.90% 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
Original Data Source: Standard & Poor’s Compustat database &CRSP database 
Sample: 1570 observations for127 firms 
Period: 1985 – 2003 
 
Table 3-4 shows the situation when EPS is positive. In nearly half instances 
(44.76%22), REITs pay out excess dividend even when their current EPS is worse 
than that of the previous financial year.  
 
Table 3-4: Summary of Excess Dividend Payout when EPS >0 
 
 Payout ratio > 0.95  before 2001 
Payout ratio > 0.90   
2001 and onward 
No. of observations 787 254 







No. of observations 341 446 125 129 
Percentage 43.33% 56.67% 49.21% 50.79% 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
Original Data Source: Standard & Poor’s Compustat database &CRSP database 
Sample: 1570 observations for127 firms 
Period: 1985 – 2003 
                                                        
21 (29+25)/ 102 * 100% =52.94% 





From the results in Table 3-3 and Table 3-4, we can find that REIT managers pay out 
more excess dividend when EPS drops and distribute less excess dividend when 
EPS increase so as to maintain a stable total dividend payout for each period. The 
variation in total dividend may not match the actual variation in REIT’s earning. 
During good times, the total dividend will reflect the high earning of a REIT. 
However, during bad times, the total dividend will not be a good indicator of the 
REIT’s actual earning, because REIT managers strive to smoothen the total 
dividend compared to previous period. This dividend smoothing strategy may 
potentially distort the information content behind total dividends.  
 
On the other hand, high excess dividend payouts during bad times will reduce the 
cash flows in current period, which has a substantial effect on future cash flows 
and incomes. Therefore the analysis on excess dividends can give us a more 
accurate and practical view on future cash flow and profitability for REITs.  
 
3.4 Summary  
 
This section begins with a discussion about the special characteristics of REITs. 
Several reasons prove that the dividend policy study in REIT industry can overcome 
many obstacles that complicate previous studies. This also makes REIT industry 
become a good and interesting testing ground for information signaling theory and 
agency cost theory.  
 
As the dividend debate in this industry is more and more heated, the literature review 
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of REIT’s dividend policy shows that recent results are more mixed. Based on 
statutory distribution requirement, one of most important characteristics of REIT, a 
concept of “Excess Dividend” is advocated. The reasons why this excess dividend is 
considered as a better measurement for the REIT’s dividend policy are discussed 






4.1 “Wealth Penalty” Caused by Firm Risk 
 
Dividend payouts convey the information to the capital market concerning a firm’s 
future earnings potential. Information signaling theory and agency cost theory both 
indicate that the increased or high dividend will enhance the stock value (firm value). 
Former researches have gained much evidence about the positive relationship between 
stock price and dividend payout. When a dividend cut happens, it will have a reverse 
effect on the stock price (firm value). A stock price drop, also known as shareholder 
“wealth penalty”, will be associated with cutting dividends.  
 
Eades (1982) studies this “wealth penalty”, which is based on the relationship 
between dividend yield and the firm risk. In his dividend signaling model, the stock 
value variance is considered as the proxy of cash flow variance. The set of 
assumptions coupled with the specific signaling-cost function leads to an objective 
function for the firm’s insiders. 
  







1  ,                    (4.1.1) 
where    )(DE          firm value at time 0; 
         r              risk-free market rate of interest; 
         V             expected liquidation value of the firm at time 1; 
         D             dividends contracted at time 0 to be paid at time 1; 
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         X             actual time 1 liquidation value  
         )( DX −β      market accepted penalty assessed at time 1 to those firms 
which are unable to pay D; 
         ( )Xf          density function of liquidating value at time 1. 
 
The objective function is composed of two distinct terms. The first term )(DV , 
represents the value response function. The second term represents the expected cost 
of signaling whereby the moral hazard penalty increases with the degree of the 
shortfall )( DX −β . Therefore a tradeoff exists between the informational gains 
associated with the dividend and the costs of not making the promised payment.     
 
The marginal benefits and costs of signaling are equated as follows: 





E β  ,                                (4.1.2) 
where    )(DF    is the cumulative distribution of X  evaluated at D . 
 
By rewriting Equation (4.1.2), we can get   
( )DFDV ⋅=′ β)(  ,                                                (4.1.3) 
Where )(DFβ  is the strictly positive marginal cost of signaling, and )(DV ′  is the 
marginal benefit in expected firm value as a result of the signal. When the marginal 
cost of signaling is decreasing with respect to the determinant of true value, M, we 
can get 
( ) 0)( <⋅−=∂∂ DfMDF ββ .                                        (4.1.4) 
 
The signaling equilibrium demands the ex post values realized at time 1 equal those 
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signaled at time 0. This means that the signaled market values impound the expected 
signaling costs as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) dXXfDXMDV D
X
⋅⋅−+= ∫ ∗∗ *)(β  ,                              (4.1.5) 
where ∗D is the equilibrium dividend payout. 
2*)(
2












dD σ  ,                                    (4.1.7) 
where 
2σ  is firm risk.  
 
From Equation (4.1.7), we can get a negative relationship between dividend payout 
and the firm risk, which indicates that a “penalty” exists, that is, a stock price drop or 
shareholder “wealth penalty” will be associated with the announcement of cutting 
dividends. Eades (1982), Wang, Ko, Erickson and Gau (1993), Bradley, Capozza and 
Seguin (1998) all conclude that the dividend cut will cause the stock price drop with 
empirical evidence.    
  
4.2 Excess Dividend Payout and Cash Flow Volatility  
 
The dividend cutting behavior is a strong signal to the market, which makes the stock 
price drop quickly. The shareholder’s wealth “penalty” will be associated with the 
announcement of cutting dividends. The information signaling theory supports that 
manager will avoid this “penalty” and make a relatively low dividend payout when 
the future cash flow is more volatile, which forms the main argument between the two 
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theories. Agency cost theory predicts that firms with volatile cash flows would pay 
out a greater proportion of their cash flows as dividend to avoid potential agency cost. 
These two theories have completely opposite explanations. Which factor is more 
influential: the managers’ fear of the “penalty” or the influence from stockholders to 
reduce the agency cost? In this section, an empirical model will be constructed to test 
the relationship between excess dividend payouts and expected cash flow volatility.  
 
4.2.1 Excess Dividend Equation 
 
Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1998) specify the dividend as a function of cash flow 
and its volatility. A dividend equation is as follows: 
,2110 Ytttt EYED σααα ++= +                                        (4.2.1) 
where tD  is the dividend per share in period t; 1+tY  is the cash flow available to 
shareholders during the next period; and YtE σ  is the expected volatility of cash 
flows available to shareholders.  
 
There is a clear prediction for the positive relation between dividend payout and the 
mean future cash flow ( 1α ). Higher subsequent cash flow will support higher 
dividend payout. The sign of 2α  is the most important in our study to distinguish 
between agency cost and information signaling theory. Under agency cost theory, the 
sign of 2α  will be positive: higher dividend will be distributed to avoid agency cost 
when higher uncertainty relies in the future cash flow. But according to signaling 
theory, managers prefer to pay fewer dividends when future cash flow is more volatile 





As our discussions in the former parts, compared to the traditional way using total 
dividend per share, the excess dividend per share should be a better measurement for 
the dividend policy in REITs industry. This study tries to construct an excess dividend 
equation to empirically analyze the dividend payout behavior and cash flow volatility. 
According to information theory, the managers will lower the excess dividend in case 
the REIT can not distribute the announced amount when the future cash flow is not 
uncertain. The agency cost theory supports that the greater excess dividend payout 
can be used against non-value maximizing investments for firms with greater cash 
flow uncertainty.   
 
This study employs a sample of U.S. Equity REITs to explore the relationship 
between dividend payout behavior and cash flow volatility. One of the most 
significant characteristics in REITs industry is the highly regulated dividend payout 
behavior. By the US IRS (Internal Revenue Code) rule, REIT should distribute 90% 
of taxable income (95% before REIT Modernization Act of 1999). We define the part 
which exceeds the statutory distributed portion as Excess Dividend Payout ( tED )
23.  
,tttt EPSDED ⋅−= ρ                                              (4.2.2) 
where tρ  is statutory distributed percentage in period t; tEPS  is the earnings per 
share in period t.  
 
tEPS  is positively related to the firm’s cash flow tY .  
,10 tt YEPS ⋅+= ββ                                                (4.2.3) 
                                                        
23 Table 3-1 discusses the details of definition and calculation. 
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Based on Equation (4.2.2) and (4.2.3), we can get: 
,)( 1010 tttttttt YDYDED βρβρββρ −−=⋅+⋅−=                       (4.2.4) 
Based on Equation (4.2.1) and (4.2.4), we can get: 
,102110 tttYtttt YEYEED βρβρσααα −−++= +   
.)( 211100 Ytttttt EYYE σαβραβρα +−+−= +                         (4.2.5) 
 
To control for the mean effects in tE 1+tY , a simple model of cash flow forecasting is 
constructed as  
),( 11 tttttt YYEYYE −+= ++                                           (4.2.6) 
and 
,   111 +++ += tttt YEY ε                                                (4.2.7) 
then 
.)( 111 +++ −−+= tttttt YYYYE ε                                         (4.2.8) 
Consider the Equation (4.2.5) and (4.2.8) jointly, we can get   
[ ] ,)()( 1211100 ttYttttttt YEYYYED βρσαεαβρα −+−−+⋅+−= ++   
.)()()( 112111100 ++ −+−+−+−= tYtttttt EYYY εασααβραβρα           (4.2.9) 
 
By revising Equation (4.2.9), the empirical models of dividend policy and cash flow 
volatility will be based on 
,)( 1210 iitttt XhYYYED ∑+−++= +γγγ                               (4.2.10) 
where iX is A set of variables to influence the volatility of future cash flows. Based on 
Equation (4.2.10), excess dividend payout can be considered as a function of cash 
flow volume and its volatility.  
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4.2.2 Proxies for Cash Flow volatility 
 
Former studies have employed contemporaneous (Eades, 1982) or lagged stock return 
volatility as a proxy for cash flow volatility. In this study two methods are used to 
indicate this volatility:  
 
First, the approach from Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1998) is employed, which 
uses firm-specific predictors of the volatility of available cash flow over the coming 
year. The following variables can be considered as iX , which will influence the 
volatility of future cash flow.  
 
(1) Firm size: when more assets are included in the portfolio and the market value of a 
portfolio increases, the contribution of single asset’s own volatility is reduced. We 
choose natural log of each REIT’s total asset as the size variable24.  
 
(2) Leverage ratio: long term debt to total asset ratio. This can capture the effects of 
financial leverage on the portfolio-level of cash flows. As the debt to asset ratio 
increases, the volatility of cash flows will increase.  
 
Under information signaling theory, dividends are assumed to be lower when the 
expected cash flow is more volatile, that is, when the REIT’s firm size is smaller, 
and/or when the REIT is highly levered. Agency cost theory suggest opposite 
                                                        
24 I choose both market value asset and book value asset to reflect the size factor in different regression 
models, because the market value includes the direct influence from the stock price. This influence may 




relationship.25   
 
Using the same method in Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1998), this study also 
construct the unsigned percent change in FFO as a measurement of cash flow 
volatility. Then a regression on this measurement is made against firm size and 
leverage ratio to test whether the two proposed proxies reflect the cash flow 
volatility.26 The set of two variables (firm size and leverage ratio) is replaced with a 
single variable, called as “fitted FFO volatility”. This new variable is the fitted value 
from the regression above, which is a linear combination of the two (firm size and 
leverage ratio). This “fitted FFO volatility” then is used as a proxy for cash flow 
volatility in the panel regression.   
 
Second, the standard deviation of monthly earning per share over period t, itEPSSD )( , 
is employed to indicate the cash flow volatility. Standard deviation provides a good 
and direct indication of volatility. This historical volatility of earnings, itEPSSD )( , 
performs as a proxy of expected future cash flow volatility27 which indicates the 
future risk of a firm. Information signaling theory assumes that firms with higher 
itEPSSD )(  will pay out less dividends as the cash flow is more volatile. While 
agency cost theory gives opposite explanations. 
 
To make all the relationships above more clear, a simple comparison between 
                                                        
25 Herfindahl measures of diversification are also included in Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1998). 
They use both the geographic and property-type diversification to indicate future cash flow volatility. 
Unfortunately, we don’t obtain those diversification data. So diversification variables are omitted in our 
study. 
 
26 The coefficient estimates are consistent with our assumption: bigger firm has lower cash flow 
volatility while higher leverage ratio has higher cash flow volatility.  
 
27 The monthly cash flow figure can not be obtained from the dataset in this study. 
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explanations of two theories is shown in Table 4-1.  
 
Table 4-1: Comparison between agency cost theory and information signaling theory 
 
Dependent variable: Excess Dividend Payout per share  
The expected signs of relative coefficients are in the brackets. 
 
 





Size(Natural log of Total Asset) (-) lower excess dividend (-) 
higher excess dividend 
(+) 
Leverage(Debt to Asset Ratio) (+) higher excess dividend (+) 
lower excess dividend 
(-) 
Fitted Volatility (+) higher excess dividend (+) 
lower excess dividend 
(-) 
Standard Deviation of EPS (+) higher excess dividend (+) 
lower excess dividend 
(-) 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
4.2.3 Panel Regression Specifications  
 
The empirical tests for excess dividend payout behavior will be based on the 
following model:  
 
[ ] ,)1(2)1(10 itijtjtiititiiiit XhFFFED εγγγ ++−++= ∑−−                     (4.2.11)            
where 
itED      natural log of dividends per share of firm i paid out over year t;  
)1( −tiF      natural log of FFO per share of firm i paid out over year t-1; 
)1( −− tiit FF  natural log of FFO per share paid out of firm i over year t less that over 
year t-1; 




)1( −tiF  and )1( −− tiit FF  are included to account for projected cash flows. ijtX  stands 
for the factors which influence the future cash flow volatility. To Control the time 
factor influence and market fluctuations, a series of annual intercepts (dummy 
variables) are also included in the regression.   
 
Because the data processes both time-series and cross-sectional features, we estimate 
the model with panel regressions. If the intercept i0γ  is constant for all firms, then a 
simple OLS estimation will be used. If each firm has its own intercept i0γ , then the 
fixed effect model is the better choice. The fixed effects estimator is efficient when 
the idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated. If the intercept i0γ  is a random 
variable and is identically independently distributed, then the random effect model 
will be employed. This random effects estimator is attractive, for the unobserved 
effect is unrelated with all the explanatory variables. Hausman Test is used to measure 
the quality of fixed effect model and random effect model.  
 
4.3 Other Factors to Influence Dividend Payout Behavior28 
 
In the above discussion, only cash flow and its volatility are considered as the 
determinants for REITs’ dividend policy. In this section, in order to examine the 
influences from other factors, more independent variables are discussed in the 
dividend payout determining process.     
 
4.3.1 Growth Rate of Asset 
                                                        
28 The discussion in this section is based on the empirical model in Lu and Shen (2003). However, the 
institutional holding factor and management type are not included in this study mainly because of the 




How to deal with the free cash flow in hand? Managers always have two choices: one 
is to distribute to shareholders as dividends; the other is to retain the money for 
further growth. The agency cost within the firm is usually involved in its growth 
process. In this section, the firm’s growth is included in the regression. Two variables 
are employed to capture the growth factor: (1) annual growth rate of total asset; (2) 
Tobin’s Q.  
 
One method is to use realized growth rate of total asset for the previous fiscal year 
(GRATE). Based on the simple constant dividend growth model: 
,g
P
Dks +=                                                      (4.3.1) 
where sk  is required return of shareholder; P
D  is the dividend to stock price; g is 
growth rate. If we consider constant sk , then higher g  will results in lower dividend 
payout. Firms with high growth rate will have motivation to payout less dividend and 
retain the capital for expansion. The shareholders prefer the capital gains than the 
current cash dividend. We hypothesize that there is a negative relationship between 
dividend payout and yearly growth rate.  
 
Another measure of growth, Tobin's Q, is the ratio of the market value of a firm's 
assets to the replacement cost of the firm's assets (Tobin 1969). By employing Tobin’s 
Q, We can jointly analyze book value asset and market value asset, which have been 
separately used in the former panel regression.  
 
Tobin’s Q in this research is computed by dividing Market value of total asset to Book 
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Value of total asset. As the lack of actual property price data, market value asset is 
defined as the sum of market value of equity and book value of the liability. The 
market value will capture the growth opportunity in real estate investment. With high 
growth rate, firms will retain the dividend for the future expansion. According to Lu 
and Shen (2003), the residuals are first estimated from the regression of the Tobin’s Q 
on the GRATE and yearly depreciation expense. Then the panel regression are 
re-estimated with Tobin’s Q replaced by residual (RES).         
 
4.3.2 Return of Asset 
 
ROA can be used as a measurement of management performance. A more profitable 
firm will face less pressure or monitoring from the outside shareholders. So less 
excess dividend will be required when the ROA is higher. From the perspective of 
agency cost avoidance, we can assume that a negative relationship exists between the 
firm’s ROA and excess dividend payout.  
  
4.4 Total Dividend Equation 
 
According to Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1998), the dividend equation can be 
written as  
iitttt XhYYYD ∑+−++= + )( 1210 χχχ .                                (4.4.1) 
The coefficients values in Equation (4.2.10) are different from those of Equation 
(4.4.1). However, the signs of those corresponding coefficients keep the same. It 
means that the relationship between tED  and cash flow and its volatility is 
consistent with that in dividend equation. We argue that tED  is a better 
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measurement to empirically test the REITs’ dividend payout behavior.  
The former dividend equation is employed as a robust test in our following empirical 
analysis. The empirical model is similar as Equation (4.2.11). 
[ ] itijtjtiititiiiit XhFFFD εγγγ ++−++= ∑−− )1(2)1(10 .                      (4.4.2) 
 
4.5 Impact from Change of Statutory Distribution Rate in 2001 
 
The statutory dividend distribution rate for U.S. equity REITs has been reduced from 
95% to 90%. This section will discuss the analysis about the influences from this 
regulation change. 
 
4.5.1 Dividend Changes in 2001 
 
Under new regulation, REITs can pay out less statutory part to shareholders assuming 
unchanged earnings. Have this regulation change influenced the REITs’ dividend 
distributions? Table 4-2 shows the change of total dividend and excess dividend in 
2001 under different earning conditions. 
Table 4-2: Effect from Change of Statutory Distributed Rate from 95% to 90% 
 
Table 4-2(a)   EPS and Total Dividend 
 
  EPS does not decrease EPS decreases 
No. of observations 53 69 
Percentage 43.44% 56.56% 
  Dividend decreases




Dividend does not 
decrease 
   unchanged increasing  unchanged increasing
No. of observations 6 6 41 20 10 39 






Table 4-2(b)   EPS and Excess Dividend   
 
  EPS does not decrease EPS decreases 
No. of observations 53 69 










Excess dividend does 
not decrease 
   unchanged increasing  unchanged increasing
No. of observations 30 0 23 5 0 64 
Percentage 56.60% 0% 43.40% 7.25% 0% 92.75% 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
Original Data Source: Standard & Poor’s Compustat database &CRSP database 
Sample: 122 observations  
Period: year 2001 
 
From the results of Table 4-2(a), we can find that most of REITs don’t reduce total 
dividend no matter their earnings rise or drop. In Table 4-2(b), 92.75% of REITs 
increase excess dividend to maintain the total dividend when the EPS drops. There 
seems no obvious influence from the regulation change in 2001 on REITs’ dividend 
distributions. To explore this question further, two separate probit regressions on 
REIT’s excess dividend and total dividend payout are employed. The dependent 
variable reflects the choice for REITs’ dividend payout in the year 2001: decrease or 
not decrease. The dependent variable is coded 1 if a firm reduces total dividend or 
excess dividend and 0 if it does not. Several variables are used to capture the 
characteristics of cash flow and its volatility: FFO, change of FFO, firm size factor, 
financial leverage ratio. In addition, the actual change of EPS and a dummy variable29 
indicating the change of EPS are also included in the probit regressions.  
 
 
                                                        
29 The dummy equals to 1 when EPS drops compared to last year, and 0 when EPS does not decrease. 
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4.5.2 Probit Analysis of Information Content of Current Dividend Payouts 
 
The discussion above shows that most of REITs managers choose to maintain or 
increase the dividend even when the EPS and statutory distribution rate both drop. Is 
it a kind of signal to the market that managers believe that the future earning 
prospective will be improved?  
 
Li, Sun and Ong (2005) mention that current dividends should have two opposing 
effects on future dividends. From one side, an increase in current dividend signals 
higher future cash flows which implies higher future dividend. So a positive 
relationship may exist between current and future dividend changes. From other side, 
an increase in current dividend may limit the increase of future dividend if some 
optimal payout ratio target has been achieved. In addition, an increase in current 
dividend will reduce the cash flows in current period, and may have a negative effect 
on future incomes and dividends. Thus, the relationship between current and future 
dividend changes may be negative.  
      
To explore this question further, we run a probit regression to test the relationship 
between current and future dividend changes as follows:  
itiititiiitiiti LMVEPSLASTDCDFD 32)1(110)1( θθθθθ ++++= −+  
,654 ititiitiiti ROAGRATELR σθθθ ++++                          (4.5.1) 
 
itiititiiitiiti LMVEPSLASTDCDFD 32)1(110)2( θθθθθ ++++= −+  




)1( +tiFD     value 1 if future dividend per share of firm i over year t+1 increases and 
0 otherwise;  
)2( +tiFD     value 1 if future dividend per share of firm i over year t+2 increases and 
0 otherwise;  
itCD        value 1 if current dividend per share of firm i increases and 0 otherwise; 
)1( −tiLASTD  value 1 if previous dividend per share of firm i over year t-1 increases 
and 0 otherwise; 
itEPS       value 1 if current dividend per share of firm i increases and 0 otherwise; 
itLMV      natural log of market value of asset of firm i over year t; 
itLR        leverage ratio of firm i over year t; 
itGRATE    annual growth rate of asset of firm i over year t; 
itROA       annual return rate of asset of firm i over year t. 
 
The year 2001 is the current year t in the regression. The objective is to test the 
relationship between )1( +tiFD  / )2( +tiFD  and itCD . )1( +tiFD  can be considered as a 
short time influence test while )2( +tiFD  as a median time influence test. When the 
regulation has been changed and current earning is not good, REITs managers still 
maintain or increase the dividend. Is this behavior a strong signal to indicate an 
increase of future cash flows and dividends? )1( −tiLASTD  is included to control the 
lagged effect from previous dividend changes. itEPS  is used to examine the 
influence from current earning to future dividend payout. itLMV , itLR , itGRATE  




The change of current dividend can also influence the future cash flows of a firm but 
not only the future dividend. Using the similar method, we use the following probit 
regression to test whether the change of current dividend can be considered as a signal 
for future cash flow change.  
itiititiiitiiti LMVEPSLASTDCDFC 32)1(110)1( θθθθθ ++++= −+  
,654 ititiitiiti ROAGRATELR σθθθ ++++                          (4.5.3) 
 
itiititiiitiiti LMVEPSLASTDCDFC 32)1(110)2( θθθθθ ++++= −+  
,654 ititiitiiti ROAGRATELR σθθθ ++++                          (4.5.4) 
where 
)1( +tiFC     value 1 if future FFO
30 per share of firm i over year t+1 increases and 0 
otherwise,  
)2( +tiFC     value 1 if future FFO per share of firm i over year t+2 increases and 0 
otherwise.  
 
4.6 Summary  
 
Managers always have intentions to avoid the “wealth penalty” associated with 
dividend cuts, which forms the basis for information signaling framework. In this 
chapter, a theoretic framework of “wealth penalty” from Eades (1982) is reviewed 
based on the relationship between dividend yield and the firm risk. A lot of empirical 
evidences also prove that a stock price drop or shareholder “wealth penalty” will be 
associated with the announcement of cutting dividends. 
                                                        




An excess dividend regression model is established based on the dividend equation 
from Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1998). The cash flow and its volatility are 
considered as the determinants for the dividend policy. The cash flow volatility is the 
focus of this study, which reflects the most important point in the debate between two 
theories. The firm size factor, financial leverage level, “fitted volatility” and standard 
deviation of FFO are employed as the pixies for expected volatility. A total dividend 
regression is used as a robust test for the excess dividend analysis. The influences 
form other factors: firm growth and earning situation, are also jointly analyzed with 
the cash flow volatility, in order to further understand the dividend determining 
process.  
 
The statutory distribution rate for U.S. equity REITs was reduced from 95% to 90% in 
2001. However most of REITs in our sample choose to maintain or increase the 
dividend in spite of both lower EPS and lower statutory distribution rate. A set of 
probit regression models has been constructed to test:  
 
(1) whether the dividend payouts are influenced by the regulation changes;  
 
(2) whether the dividend maintenance or increase is a kind of signal to the market that 




Data Sample and Descriptive Statistics  
 
5.1 Data Sample  
 
The sample contains a subset of the REITs listed in the NAREIT31 Source Books in 
2003. The original data ranges from 1985 to 2003, while availability of individual 
firm data also depends on their respective listing date. The database focuses on equity 
REITs and excludes all mortgage and hybrid REITs due to their different business 
characteristics and asset structure. REITs which are not traded on the NYSE, AMEX 
or NASDAQ are also excluded from our sample. Considering all these exclusions, the 
sample of this study includes 135 equity REITs32.  
 
US REITs company fundamental data (Balance Sheet data and Cash Flow Statement 
data, etc) are obtained from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. REITs firm share 
price are gained from CRSP (Centre for Research in Security Prices). In this empirical 
research, annual data analysis is employed and the monthly data is also obtained to 
calculate the volatility of earnings.   
 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 5-1 reports means, median, extreme values and standard deviation for a 
numbers of summary statistics calculated across the sample of 1201 observations for 
                                                        
31 National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts 
 
32 A name list of REITs is in Appendix (A).  
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122 firms.33 FFO is fund from operations per share. Asset value includes both book 
value (BV Asset) and market value (MV Asset).   
 
 
Table 5-1: Summary of Statistics 
             
Variable Mean   Median Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  
Dividend per share (US$) 1.53 1.58 4.86 0.03 0.67
Ln (Dividend per share) 0.42 0.46 1.58 -3.51 0.59
Excess Dividend per share (US$) 0.40 0.39 3.34 -5.32 0.69
Ln(FFOt-1) 0.75 0.83 2.41 -3.22 0.66
Ln(FFOt) -Ln(FFOt-1) 0.05 0.06 2.4 -2.58 0.31
Asset(BV) (million US$) 5727.40 840.21 647483 7.83 39527.04
Ln (BV Asset) 6.65 6.73 13.39 2.06 1.65
Asset(MV) (million US$) 5215.79 970.31 581625.6 4.13 36624.79
Ln (MV Asset) 6.71 6.88 13.27 1.42 1.63
Leverage Ratio(BV Asset) 0.43 0.44 1.07 0 0.19
Leverage Ratio(MV Asset) 0.45 0.46 1.12 0 0.16
Long term debt 1578.55 372.88 170004 0 8272.067
Earning per share (US$) 1.17 1.15 6.36 -4.97 0.96
Dividend / FFO 0.59 0.62 5.67 -19.91 0.70
Payout Ratio  1.14 1.20 53.6 -644.361 22.40
Dividend Yield 0.077 0.073 0.560 0.003 0.035
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
Original Data Source: Standard & Poor’s Compustat database &CRSP database 
Sample: 1201 observations for 122 firms 




[1] Market Value of Asset   = Liability + Market Value of Equity  
= Liability + Share Price*Outstanding Shares   
 
[2]Leverage Ratio (BV Asset) = Long Term Debt / BV Asset 
 
[3]Leverage Ratio (MV Asset) = Long term debt / MV Asset 
 
[4]Dividend Yield           = Dividend per share / share price 
 
[5]Payout Ratio             = Dividend per share / Earning per Share 
 
                                                        
33 The number of firms and the time period in Table 5-1 is different from the original dataset. Some 
observations are excluded because of the missing data in some years. The observations with negative 




A negative payout ratio means that the sign of EPS is negative. In another word, the 
firm pays out the dividend even when it does not make any profits. In Table 5-1, the 
average payout ratio of dividend over FFO (0.59) is high, compared to the average 
ratio of dividend over cash flow ratio of 0.114 for US industrial firms (Porta, Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 2000). This implies that REIT industry may have fewer agency 
problems, for a great portion of profits has been already paid out. However, the 
Dividend/FFO in the sample ranges from -19.91 to 5.67, which indicates that 
significant differences exist in the distributed portions of cash flows. REITs managers 
can actually decide the portion distributed to shareholders as dividend. They still have 
great control in the firm’s free cash flows however there is a strict regulation on 







Empirical Results  
 
This Chapter presents detailed discussions based on the empirical results: (1) excess 
dividend regression; (2) excess dividend and other influences; (3) total dividend 
regression; (4) impact from change of statutory distribution rate in 2001. The 
objectives are focused on the dividend debate between information signaling theory 
and agency cost theory. The REITs’ dividend policies will be analyzed from the 
relationship between dividend payouts and cash flow volatility.    
 
6.1 Excess Dividend Regression 
 
Three types of panel regression models (common, fixed and random) are employed 
based on Equation (4.2.11). Five different arrangements of explanatory variables are 
used for each type panel regression. The dependent variable is natural log of excess 
dividend per share over a given calendar year. To control the time fluctuations and 
market influence, a series of annual intercepts (dummy variables) are also included in 
the empirical model but not reported. In addition, each variable is measured at the end 
of the fiscal year. Only the results from fixed effect model are reported in Table 6-1, 
because the results from Hausman test shows that fixed effect model is better than 







Table 6-1: Excess Dividend Regression 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Ln(Excess Dividend)34         
  1 2 3 4 5 













0.1 0.914 -0.069 -1.03 0.106 0.842 0.346 2.450** 0.099 0.924 
 
Ln(BV Asset)     -0.193 -2.059**         
 
Ln(MV Asset)       -0.237 -3.173**      
 




         0.092 2.671**   
 
SD(EPS)             0.211 2.203**
                
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.377   0.402   0.397   0.336   0.383   
 




0.092   0.223   0.037   0.001   0.056  
DW stat 1.502   1.643   1.953   1.021   1.331   
 
[1] ***, **, * significance at respective 1%, 5%, and 10%  
 
[2] Only the results in fixed effect model are reported in above table. To control for the 
market-wide and industry-wide fluctuations, a series of annual dummy variables are estimated 




The first two explanatory variables: Ln(FFOt-1) and Ln(FFOt) -Ln(FFOt-1), 
measures the effects from cash flow volume. The expectation is that firms with more 
cash flows will pay out more as dividends. From results from Table 6-1, all 
coefficients of Ln(FFOt-1) are positive but two of them are nonsignificant. Most 
coefficients of Ln(FFOt) -Ln(FFOt-1) are positive (with one exception -0.069 in 
Column 2 but it is nonsignificant). This supports the expectation that cash flow is a 
very influential factor in determining the excess dividend payout. In addition, the 
                                                        
34 The logarithmic format will exclude those REITs which do not pay out excess dividend from the sample. 
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explanatory power of the change in cash flow decreases because the magnitude of the 
coefficients Ln(FFOt) -Ln(FFOt-1) is smaller than that of Ln(FFOt-1).  
 
In Columns 2 and 3, the proxies for cash flow volatility are included in the regressions: 
BV asset and leverage ratio in Column 2; MV asset and leverage ratio in Column 3. 
The assumption is that large firm size and low leverage ratio will result in low cash 
flow volatility. According to the agency cost theory: (1) the signs of coefficients for 
asset should be negative; (2) the signs of coefficients for leverage should be positive. 
In contrast, the results should have opposite signs under the information signaling 
theory. From the firm size aspect, both BV and MV results are negative and 
significant. And all coefficients of leverage ratio are positive and significant. The 
results are consistent with the agency cost theory.  
 
“Fitted FFO volatility” and SD(EPS) are both used to quantify the volatility of cash 
flows. According to the agency cost hypothesis, the signs of coefficients for them 
should be positive, while negative under information signaling theory. In Column 4 
and 5, the coefficients of “fitted FFO volatility” and SD(EPS) are positive and 
significant, which strongly support the agency cost hypothesis that higher cash flow 
volatility results in high excess dividend payout for reducing the potential agency 
cost. 
 
The results in excess dividend regression provide compelling evidence concerning 
agency problems of REITs. Although US IRS has made strict earnings distribution 
rules for REIT industry aiming to protect the shareholders from agency problems, the 
dividend policy of REITs may have its own monitoring functions against the potential 
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agency costs. The REIT firms with larger cash flow volatility will pay out more 
excess dividend, in order to avoid non-value-maximizing expansions.  
 
6.2 Excess Dividend and Other Influences 
 
To explore the excess dividend payout behavior further, we also employ other 
independent variables in the panel regression model: GRATE, Tobin’s Q and ROA. The 
empirical results from fixed effect model are reported in Table 6-2.   
 
Table 6-2: Excess Dividend and Other Influences Regression 
 
Dependent Variable:  Ln(Excess Dividend)      
  1 2 3 4  






Value t-value  
Ln(FFO t-1) 0.335 2.022* 0.402 2.646** 0.411 3.297** 0.356 2.299*  
 
Ln(FFOt) -Ln(FFOt-1) 0.337 3.312** 0.285 2.033* 0.276 3.453** 0.195 2.341*  
 
Ln(MV Asset) -0.007 -0.922 -0.201 -1.996*       
 
Leverage Ratio 0.103 2.835** -0.013 -0.786       
 
Fitted FFO volatility       0.124 2.226*    
 
SD(EPS)          0.091 2.001*  
 
GRATE -0.19 -2.006* 0.104 1.893* -0.204 -2.987** -0.204 -2.292*  
 
Tobin's Q -0.16 -2.101*          
 
RES    -0.224 -2.061* -0.192 -2.579** 0.009 0.435  
 
ROA -0.77 -1.523 -0.04 -1.255 -0.921 -1.986* -0.098 -1.053  
              
Adjusted R-squared 0.412   0.384   0.383   0.405    
 
Prob(F-statistic) 0   0   0   0   
 
Hausman Test(P value) 0.033   0.101   0.04   0.079   
 
DW stat 1.332   1.589   1.692   1.552    
 
[1] ***, **, * significance at respective 1%, 5%, and 10%  
 
[2] Only the results in fixed effect model are reported in above table. To control for the 
market-wide and industry-wide fluctuations, a series of annual dummy variables are estimated 




The negative and significant coefficient of firm size factor Ln (MV Asset) strongly 
supports the agency cost theory. The coefficient of Leverage Ratio in Column 2 is 
negative but nonsignificant. Three of four coefficients of annual market value asset 
growth rate (GRATE) are negative and significant. Most of the coefficients of Tobin’s 
Q and RES are significantly negative. It is consistent with the assumption that firms 
with higher growth rate will pay out less dividend. In addition, all the coefficients of 
ROA are negative, which is consistent with the expectation: managers of firms with 
good return rate will face less pressure and monitoring from shareholders who usually 
ask for more dividend distributions. 
 
According to the above results, it can be concluded that growth opportunities and the 
prospect of return influence the REITs dividend payout behaviors, which is consist 
with Lu and Shen (2003). Firms with high growth rate will pay out less in order to 
maintain the fast expansions. Managers of the firms with good return will face fewer 
pressures from shareholders, and they will distribute lower dividends. When those 
influences are controlled, the relationship between excess dividend and cash flow 
volatility is observed as a positive one. The results from Table 6-2 support that higher 
excess dividends are distributed when cash flows are more volatile, which is 
consistent with agency cost theory. The REITs’ dividend policy performs monitoring 
function and gives solutions to the agency cost problems. The agency cost theory is 
still strongly supported when other factors together with cash flows are considered.     
 




Using same firms during same time period, Equation (4.4.2) Total Dividend 
Regression is employed as a robust test for Excess Dividend Regression. Three types 
of panel regression models (common, fixed and random) are also included and only 
the results from fixed effect model are reported in Table 6-3. 
 
Table 6-3: Total Dividend Regression 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Total Dividend)         
  1 2 3 4 5 













0.468 6.125*** 0.486 5.330*** 0.465 7.633*** 0.257 4.502** 0.463 5.039***
 
Ln(BV Asset)     -0.052 -3.928**         
 
Ln(MV Asset)       0.004 0.231      
 




         0.048 2.012*   
 
SD(EPS)             -0.046 2.396** 
                
Adjusted  
R-squared 0.795   0.796   0.797   0.662   0.795   
 




0.000   0.000   0.024   0.134   0.022  
 
DW stat 1.135   1.083   1.204   1.282   1.019   
 
[1] ***, **, * significance at respective 1%, 5%, and 10%  
 
[2] Only the results in fixed effect model are reported in above table. To control for the 
market-wide and industry-wide fluctuations, a series of annual dummy variables are estimated 
in the regression but not reported.   
 
 
The coefficients of Ln (FFOt-1) and Ln (FFOt) -Ln (FFOt-1) are all positive and 
significant. The coefficients of Ln (FFOt-1) are only a little bigger than those of Ln 
(FFOt) -Ln (FFOt-1). This is different from the results of Bradley, Capozza and 
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Seguin (1998), in which the coefficient of Ln (FFOt) -Ln (FFOt-1) is less than half 
those of Ln (FFOt-1).  
 
The influences from others are not clear: the results in Columns 2 (negative 
coefficient for firm size) and 4 (positive coefficient for “fitted FFO volatility”) 
support agency cost theory; however, the results in Columns 3 (negative coefficient 
for leverage ratio) and 5 (negative coefficient for SD(EPS)) support information 
signaling theory. The results can not conclusively decide which theory will be 
supported.  
 
6.3.1 Comparison between Excess Dividend and Total Dividend 
 
To make a further understanding, we compare the results in Table 6-1 and Table 6-3. 
Total Dividend Regression is employed as a robust test for Excess Dividend 
Regression, based on a sample of same firms during same time period.  
 
First, the FFO and the change in FFO are significantly and positively related to the 
dividend payout, which are consistent with both two theories. And they are also quite 
influential determinants of the dividend payouts compared to other dependent 
variables.  
 
Second, the magnitude of the coefficients of cash flow volatility determinants in 
Excess Dividend Regression is larger than those in Total dividend Regression, which 
indicates the influences of these variables as proxies for cash flow volatility are more 
obvious in excess dividend analysis. The excess dividends may be more easily 
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influenced by cash flow volatility.  
 
Third, the linkages between firm size and dividend payout in different arrangements 
of Total dividend Regression are not consistent35. One interesting explanation here is 
that whether the firm size involves more information besides the cash flow volatility. 
¾ Do managers from firms with different sizes deliver different information 
contents by distributing dividends?  
¾ Do managers have other motivations other than to indicating the future cash flow 
volatility by distributing dividends?  
 
6.3.2 Firm Factor Analysis  
 
Former researchers have done some tests on the information content related to the 
firm size for dividend policy analysis. First, larger firms with more information 
released to the public and analyzed more frequently will pay fewer dividends. On the 
other hand, smaller firms with less publicity have to pay more to convey their quality 
to the market. This explanation supports the negative coefficients for asset in dividend 
determination, which is consistent with agency cost theory. Second, from the aspect 
of “Clientele effect”, some researchers explore the role of firm size in dividend policy 
and the capital structure decision. Dividend policy is determined or greatly influenced 
by the preferences of stockholders: future capital gain or current cash dividend. 
Majority of shareholders in large corporations are large institutions with a preference 
of dividends. While the small corporations owned by individuals, may retain the 
capital for future development. As a result, firm size will have a positive relationship 
                                                        
35 The coefficients for firm size in columns 2 and 3 in Table 6-3 have different signs. 
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with the dividend distribution, which is consistent with predictions under information 
signaling theory. Third, some researchers linked the dividend policy with the financial 
management of the firms. For example, Kim, Liu and S. Ghon Rhee (2003) find that 
firm size plays different roles in earnings management. Small firms engage in more 
earnings management than large-sized or medium-sized firms to avoid reporting 
losses. So the firm size may be associated with the earning, which will also directly 
influence the dividend payout. From the various angles, different explanations are 
used to analyze the effect of the firm size on dividend distribution, which makes it 
more complicated and unclear on this issue. 
 
In order to control those effects from firm size, two subgroups are constructed to run 
the above panel regressions separately. The observations available for each year are 
sorted by the market value asset and assigned to one of the two subgroups:  
(1) “Big Firm” subgroup above the median;  
(2) “Small Firm” subgroup below the median.  
 
The results from OLS for two subgroups are reported in Table 6-4 and Table 6-5. The 
sign of firm size in Table 6-4 (big firm subgroup) is significant and negative, which is 
consistent with agency cost theory. But coefficient in small firm group in Table 6-5 is 
nonsignificant. From the above results, agency cost theory still has more convincing 








Table 6-4: Excess Dividend Regression for Big Firm Subgroup 
 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Excess Dividend)                           
Subgroup: Big Firm     
  1 3 4 5 







Ln(FFO t-1) 0.349 5.176*** 0.471 1.844* 0.322 4.213*** 0.361 4.701***
 
Ln(FFOt) -Ln(FFOt-1) 0.315 4.403*** 0.352 4.002*** 0.344 2.702** 0.276 
1.799* 
 
Ln(MV Asset)     -0.008 -1.831*       
  
 
Leverage Ratio     0.021 1.908*       
  
 
Fitted FFO volatility         0.031 1.991**   
  
 
SD(EPS)             0.101 1.306 
                  
Adjusted R-squared 0.463   0.422   0.443   0.339   
Prob(F-statistic) 0   0   0   0   
DW stat 1.385   1.443   1.557   1.437   
 
[1] ***, **, * significance at respective 1%, 5%, and 10%  
[2] To control for the market-wide and industry-wide fluctuations, a series of annual dummy 
variables are estimated in the regression but not reported.   
 
 
Table 6-5: Excess Dividend Regression for Small Firm Subgroup 
 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Excess Dividend)                        
Subgroup: Small Firm     
  1 3 4 5 







Ln(FFO t-1) 0.435 5.332*** 0.439 3.793*** 0.486 5.005*** 0.436 3.372***
 
Ln(FFOt) -Ln(FFOt-1) 0.401 4.256*** 0.365 1.992** 0.335 4.502*** 0.301 
1.803* 
 
Ln(MV Asset)     -0.002 0.023       
  
 
Leverage Ratio     0.012 2.692**       
  
 
Fitted FFO volatility         0.026 1.424   
  
 
SD(EPS)             0.201 1.706* 
                  
Adjusted R-squared 0.398   0.432   0.376   0.452   
Prob(F-statistic) 0   0   0   0   
DW stat 1.289   1.335   1.549   1.396   
 
[1] ***, **, * significance at respective 1%, 5%, and 10%  
[2] To control for the market-wide and industry-wide fluctuations, a series of annual dummy 
variables are estimated in the regression but not reported.   
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6.4 Impact from Change of Statutory Distribution Rate in 2001 
 
Several probit models are employed in this section, in order to test the influence from 
statutory distribution change in 2001. Table 6-6 reports the results from the analysis 
on dividend changes in 2001.  
 
Table 6-6: Probit Analysis of Current Dividend and Future Dividend Changes in 2001  
 
Sample: 122 observations  
 
    Total Dividend     Excess Dividend   
 Eq1 Eq2 Eq3 Eq4 Eq1 Eq2 Eq3 Eq4 













































(-2.362***)   
MV Asset   -1.29E-06 (-0.312) 
1.05E-05 














































          
Prob (F 
Statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
McFadden    
R-squared 0.377 0.403 0.356 0.411 0.353 0.396 0.298 0.357 
 
[1]The z-Statistic value for coefficient is in the bracket.  
 
[2]***, **, * significance at respective 1%, 5%, and 10%  
 
 
The first four columns in Table 6-6 discuss about the total dividend payouts. Two 
explanatory variables, FFO and the “change of FFO”, greatly influence the total 
dividend payout. The “change of EPS” does not have significant influence on the 
choice of total dividend payout. Therefore the total dividends are based on whether 
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there are adequate cash flows to be paid out. Managers are not restricted by the 
current earnings, so the change of earnings is not significantly related to the dividends. 
In addition, the effects from factors associated with cash flow volatility are not 
significant.  
 
From the results of excess dividend analysis, there are no significant influences from 
FFO and the “change of FFO”. However, the “change of EPS” has significant 
influences on the choice of excess dividend payouts. When EPS drops, REITs 
managers choose to pay out more excess dividends, so the total dividends may not 
decrease. This is consistent with the former conclusion that REIT managers have 
incentives to smoothen the dividend payouts during a long period. The effects from 
factors associated with cash flow volatility are not consistent. Two of three 
coefficients for firm size factor are negative and significant while one is positive and 
significant.   
 
Table 6-6 shows an obvious dividend smoothing strategy in REITs industry. Total 
dividend payout is based on whether adequate cash flows exist in this firm. The 
change of earnings is negatively related to the excess dividend payouts. Most REITs 
do not reduce their total dividend payout although the required part has been 
decreased. Reversely, a lot of REITs even pay out more excess dividend when the 
EPS and required part both drop, in order to maintain their total dividends. The 
change of statutory distribution rate does not have significant influences on the 
REITs’ dividend policy.    
 
Based on Equation (4.5.1) and Equation (4.5.2), the changes between current and 
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future dividends are examined. Table 6-7 presents the results from the probit analysis.  
 
Table 6-7: Probit Analysis of Current Dividend and Future Dividend Changes in 2001  
 
Sample: 122 observations  
 
)1( +tiFD    )2( +tiFD   
Eq1   Eq2 
Variables    
0.404 0.201 
itCD  (0.902)  (0.723) 
0.339 0.332 
)1( −tiLASTD  (1.423*)  (0.885) 
0.399 -0.048 
itEPS  (0.445)  (-0,254) 
0.209 -0.022 
itLMV  (1.587*)  (-0.487) 
-0.056 -1.671 
itLR  (-0.793)  (-0.684) 
-0.449 -0.340 




itROA  (0.007) 
 
(-0.073) 
    
Prob (F Statistic) 0   0 
McFadden R-squared 0.358   0.301 
 
[1]The z-Statistic value for coefficient is in the bracket.  
 
[2]***, **, * significance at respective 1%, 5%, and 10%  
  
 
From the results in Table 6-7, only )1( −tiLASTD  and itLMV  are significantly and 
positively related to )1( +tiFD .  itCD  does not significantly influence neither the 
)1( +tiFD  or )2( +tiFD . Therefore there is no strong evidence to show that the current 
dividend changes can be considered as a signal for future dividend changes.  
 
The change of current dividend can also influence the future cash flows of a firm but 
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not only the future dividend. Table 6-8 reports the results based on Equation (4.5.3) 
and Equation (4.5.4). Using the similar method, a probit regression tests whether the 
change of current dividend can be considered as a signal for future cash flow change.  
 
Table 6-8: Probit Analysis of Current Dividend and Future Cash Flow Changes in 2001 
 
 
)1( +tiFC    )2( +tiFC   
Eq1   Eq2 
Variables    
0.028 0.101 
itCD  (1.002)  (0.605) 
0.091 0.127 
)1( −tiLASTD  (0.237)  (1.501*) 
0.903 0.081 
itEPS  (1.245*)  (0,584) 
0.009 0.012 
itLMV  (0.504)  (0.837) 
-0.263 -1.002 
itLR  (-0.993)  (-1.684**) 
-0.004 -0.205 




itROA  (1.307*) 
 
(1.073) 
    
Prob (F Statistic) 0   0 
McFadden R-squared 0.289   0.321 
 
[1]The z-Statistic value for coefficient is in the bracket.  
 
[2]***, **, * significance at respective 1%, 5%, and 10%  
 
There is no strong evidence, from Table 6-8, to show that REITs managers use the 
current dividend changes to signal the future changes in cash flows. One possible 
reason is that managers’ smoothing strategy has distorted the dividend’s information 
content. The current dividend changes can not be considered as an accurate indicator 




A robust test based on Equations (4.5.1), (4.5.2), (4.5.3) and (4.5.4) has also been 
done in this study, while with changes in the definition of variables. The empirical 
results are reported in Table 6-9 and Table 6-10. There are no obvious differences 
from robust test results compared to those from Table 6-7 and Table 6-8. The current 
dividend changes still can not be considered as an accurate indicator for the future 
profitability and cash flows.  
itiititiiitiiti LMVEPSLASTDCDFD 32)1(110)1( θθθθθ ++++= −+  
,654 ititiitiiti ROAGRATELR σθθθ ++++                          (4.5.1) 
 
itiititiiitiiti LMVEPSLASTDCDFD 32)1(110)2( θθθθθ ++++= −+  
,654 ititiitiiti ROAGRATELR σθθθ ++++                          (4.5.2) 
where 
)1( +tiFD     value 1 if future dividend per share of firm i over year t+1 does not 
decrease and 0 otherwise;  
)2( +tiFD     value 1 if future dividend per share of firm i over year t+2 does not 
decrease and 0 otherwise;  
itCD        value 1 if current dividend per share of firm i does not decrease and 0 
otherwise; 
)1( −tiLASTD  value 1 if previous dividend per share of firm i over year t-1 does not 
decrease and 0 otherwise; 
itEPS       value 1 if current dividend per share of firm i does not decrease and 0 
otherwise; 
itLMV      natural log of market value of asset of firm i over year t; 
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itLR        leverage ratio of firm i over year t; 
itGRATE    annual growth rate of asset of firm i over year t; 
itROA       annual return rate of asset of firm i over year t. 
 
 
Table 6-9: Probit Analysis of Current Dividend and Future Dividend Changes in 2001  
 
Sample: 122 observations  
 
)1( +tiFD    )2( +tiFD   
Eq1   Eq2 
Variables    
0.335 0.225 
itCD  (0.418)  (0.269) 
0.247 0.206 
)1( −tiLASTD  (1.002)  (0.735) 
-0.093 -0.022 
itEPS  (-0.744)  (-0,426) 
0.195 0.322 
itLMV  (1.499*)  (1.054) 
-0.105 -0.137 
itLR  (-1.602*)  (-1.546*) 
-0.336 -0.196 




itROA  (0.206) 
 
(-0.035) 
    
Prob (F Statistic) 0   0 
McFadden R-squared 0.306   0.413 
 
[1]The z-Statistic value for coefficient is in the bracket.  
 















itiititiiitiiti LMVEPSLASTDCDFC 32)1(110)1( θθθθθ ++++= −+  
,654 ititiitiiti ROAGRATELR σθθθ ++++                          (4.5.3) 
itiititiiitiiti LMVEPSLASTDCDFC 32)1(110)2( θθθθθ ++++= −+  
,654 ititiitiiti ROAGRATELR σθθθ ++++                          (4.5.4) 
where 
)1( +tiFC     value 1 if future FFO per share of firm i over year t+1 does not decrease 
and 0 otherwise;  
)2( +tiFC     value 1 if future FFO per share of firm i over year t+2 does not decrease 
and 0 otherwise.  
Table 6-10: Probit Analysis of Current Dividend and Future Cash Flow Changes in 2001 
 
 
)1( +tiFC    )2( +tiFC   
Eq1   Eq2 
Variables    
0.257 0.379 
itCD  (0.682)  (0.903) 
0.201 0.141 
)1( −tiLASTD  (1.008)  (0.553) 
0.426 0.332 
itEPS  (1.467*)  (0,941) 
0.227 0.112 
itLMV  (1.551*)  (0.725) 
0.003 -0.525 
itLR  (0.126)  (-1.104) 
-0.011 -0.302 




itROA  (1.448*) 
 
(0.663) 
    
Prob (F Statistic) 0   0 
McFadden R-squared 0.309   0.345 
 
[1]The z-Statistic value for coefficient is in the bracket.  
 
[2]***, **, * significance at respective 1%, 5%, and 10%  
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6.5 Summary  
 
This chapter shows the empirical results from different angles and various regression 
models. Four sections are included:  
(1) excess dividend regression;  
(2) excess dividend and other influences;  
(3) total dividend regression;  
(4) impact from change of statutory distribution rate in 2001.  
 
The analysis is focused on the relationship between dividend policy and cash flow 
volatility, which highly related to the dividend debate between information signaling 
theory and agency cost theory. The empirical results from excess dividend regression 
show that agency cost theory is strongly supported: the REITs pay out more excess 
dividends when the future cash flows are more volatile. But the total dividend 
regression shows unclear and consistent results about the firm size factor. Therefore 
two subgroups are constructed according to their total assets. The results from small 
firm subgroup are still not consistent. However, the results from big firm subgroup 
still support agency cost theory. 
 
To further examine the dividend policy of REITs firms, a set of probit regressions are 
employed to test the influences from statutory distribution rate change in 2001. The 
results present obvious dividend smoothing strategies of REITs managers. The 
information content of total dividend payout has been distorted and it can not be 




Summary and Conclusions  
 
This study focuses on the dividend policy from the aspect of the firm’s cash flow 
volatility, aiming to contribute in the dividend debate between two theories: information 
signaling theory and agency cost theory.  
 
7.1 Summary of Main Findings  
 
Chapter 3 summarized the special characteristics of REITs industry. The dividend debate 
between information signaling theory and agency cost theory is heated in this industry. 
Excess dividend is considered as an accurate measurement for dividend policy for REITs, 
and the reasons are analyzed in details. 
 
Chapter 4 discussed the research methodology of this study. Several panel regressions on 
both excess dividend payout and total dividend payout have been employed, including 
three types: common, fixed effect and random effect. Four variables are used as the proxy 
for the cash flow volatility: firm size, financial leverage ratio, “fitted FFO volatility” and 
standard deviation of earnings.  
 
Chapter 5 introduced the data sample used in this study, including the sample source, 
time period, sample size, calculation method, data frequency, and so on. A statistic 




Chapter 6 provides empirical evidence which can be summarized as follows: 
(1) Based on the REITs’ characteristics, excess dividend payout is considered as a better 
measurement for dividend policy in REIT industry in this study. Investors should 
focus on excess dividend to make a more accurate expectation of future cash flow 
volume and its volatility. This can help the investors better understand the REITs’ 
dividend payout strategies and the profitability in the future.  
 
(2) The agency cost theory is strongly supported by the empirical results. REIT firms pay 
out remarkable excess dividend to avoid potential agency cost. The information 
signaling theory plays a relatively minor role in REIT firms’ dividend policy. 
However, the results from total dividend regression are unclear on the firm size factor. 
But the results from subgroups still prefer the agency cost explanations.  
 
(3) The growth opportunities and profitability of a firm really influence the dividend 
policy. The cash flow volatility is still positively related to the excess dividend 
payouts, which is consistent with the agency cost theory.      
 
(4) The statutory dividend distributions of REITs have been reduced since 2001, but most 
of REITs still maintain or even increase the dividend. The REITs are reluctant to 
reduce the total dividend payouts even when the earnings and statutory distributions 
both drop. There is no strong evidence that current dividend changes can signal the 
future dividend or cash flows changes. The total dividend is not an accurate indicator 
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for investors to analyze the REITs’ earning anticipation, as its information content has 
been distorted by the smoothing strategy.  
 
The results can also give some implications for REITs regulation agencies. Although the 
REITs’ dividend payout proportion has been already strictly regulated, REITs still use 
excess dividend as a monitoring mechanism to avoid the potential agency cost. The real 
estate investment usually involves large amount of non-cash charges as depreciation and 
amortization. The REIT managers can actually adjust the earnings in a broad range. The 
statutory distribution requirements are not efficient enough to monitor REITs and control 
their investment risks. New regulations may be established to deal with the adjustment 
part from net income to actual cash flow, which can construct a more efficient monitoring 
framework for REITs industry.   
 
7.2 Research Contributions36  
 
The dividend payouts will determine the stock price and the firm value. This is an 
important issue for both shareholders and mangers. The dividend policy, driven by a lot 
of goals at the same time, is highly related to the capital structure and financing choices. 
These make the discussion about dividend policy become a complicated “project”. The 
dividend debate between information signaling theory and agency cost theory is from the 
aspect of cash flow volume and its volatility. In this way, two important variables: 
dividend and cash flow, can be jointly analyzed in one theoretical framework. 
                                                        
36 Research paper based on this study, “Cash Flow Volatility and Dividend Policy: the Case for U.S. 
REITs”, was selected for presentation at European Real Estate Society Annual Conference in Dublin, 




In this study, REIT industry is chosen as a sample for the empirical research. One 
contribution of this study is to present theoretical analysis and empirical evidence 
regarding the choice between excess dividend and total dividend. Former researchers 
have employed either excess dividend or total dividend in their analysis; however no 
comparisons have been discussed between theses two important variables. In this study, 
excess dividend is considered as a better measurement for REITs’ dividend policy, which 
implies that it is better for investors to focus on excess dividend, which will make a more 
reasonable and accurate expectation about future cash flow prospect.  
 
Another contribution of this study is the construction of excess dividend regression model, 
which is based on the approach in Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1998) and also refers to 
Lu and Shen (2003). Other factors are discussed and compared with results from former 
researches. In addition, dividend analysis prefers a large sample covering many firms 
over a relative long period. The data in this study ranges from 1985 to 2003, includes 135 
REITs firms and more 1500 observations, which is much bigger than a lot of dividend 
analysis in REITs industry. The improved empirical model and larger sample make the 
findings have more convincing power to explain the relationship between cash flow and 
dividend policy.   
 
The third contribution is the probit analysis about the influences of statutory distribution 
changes in 2001. The changes between current dividends and future dividends or future 
cash flows are empirically tested in several probit regressions. In this way, the 
Chapter 7 
74 
information content of dividend can be analyzed not only from cash flow volatility aspect, 
but also with a consideration about the correlation between current and future factors.  
 
7.3 Follow-Up Research  
 
The future research will continue as a further study on the agency problems in REIT 
industry:  
 
(1) How does the excess dividend take effect in a monitoring mechanism of REIT? It is 
interesting as many special characteristics including strict distribution regulations 
have already existed in REITs industry.  
 
(2) The dividend policy may not be separately analyzed from the firm’s capital structure. 
The jointly analysis of the dividend policy and capital structure will make a more 
complete picture of the REITs’ management strategy.  
 
(3) The corporate governance issues37 can greatly influence the effects of dividend 
distribution against the agency problems. Other monitoring mechanisms besides the 
dividend, such as contracts, organizational designs and legislation, should be also 
included into the dividend policy discussion. 
 
                                                        
37 “Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The 
corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different 
participants in the corporation, such as, the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and 
spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides 
the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance”, OECD April 1999. OECD's definition is consistent with the one presented by 
Cadbury [1992, page 15]. 
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(4) More factors and different angles should be considered in the further analysis. For 
example, the institutional investors factor38, the management type39, property type40, 
and so on.  
                                                        
38 A significant development is the increased institutional interest, which reflects the growing acceptance 
of REITs among institutional investors as an alternative to direct investment in real estate field. Chadwick 
(1993) suggests increased institutional ownership fosters greater liquidity and initiates faster dissemination 
of information resulting in lower information asymmetry between the firm and its investors. This will help 
us solve the agency problem considering the information transparency. 
 
39 Ling and Ryngaert (1995) argue that the 1990s equity REITs is more actively managed and there is more 
uncertainty about their value. The value of the REIT is derived from the intrinsic market value of the 
current properties in REIT’s portfolio, the value added by more active current management, and also the 
value of growth option from REIT expansion. Meanwhile, the active management and desire for expansion 
will cause more complicated agency problems. 
 
40 Appendix (B) presents a summary of property type for REITs in the sample of this study. 
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Appendix (A)   REITs Sample 
 
Ticker Exchange Type   Ticker Exchange Type 
ADC NYSE Retail  HPT NYSE Lodging and Resorts 
AEC NYSE Residential  HRP NYSE Industrial and Office 
AFR NYSE Industrial and Office  HTG NYSE Retail 
AHT NYSE Lodging and Resorts  HUMP NASDAQ Lodging and Resorts 
AIV NYSE Residential  IRC NYSE Retail 
AKR NYSE Retail  KIM NYSE Retail 
AMB NYSE Industrial and Office  KPA NYSE Lodging and Resorts 
AML NYSE Residential  KRC NYSE Industrial and Office 
AMV AMEX Industrial and Office  KRT NYSE Retail 
AMY AMEX Retail  KTR NYSE Industrial and Office 
ANL NYSE Residential  LHO NYSE Lodging and Resorts 
ARC NYSE Residential  LRY NYSE Industrial and Office 
ARE NYSE Industrial and Office  LXP NYSE Diversified 
ARI NYSE Industrial and Office  MAA NYSE Residential 
ASN NYSE Residential  MAC NYSE Retail 
AVB NYSE Residential  MHC NYSE Residential 
BDN NYSE Industrial and Office  MHX NYSE Lodging and Resorts 
BED NYSE Industrial and Office  MLS NYSE Retail 
BFS NYSE Retail  MNRTA NASDAQ Industrial and Office 
BNP AMEX Residential  MPG NYSE Industrial and Office 
BOY NYSE Lodging and Resorts  MPQ AMEX Diversified 
BPO NYSE TSX Industrial and Office  MRTI NASDAQ Residential 
BRE NYSE Residential  NHP NYSE Health Care 
BXP NYSE Industrial and Office  NNN NYSE Retail 
CARS NASDAQ Specialty  NXL NYSE Retail 
CBL NYSE Retail  O NYSE Retail 
CDR NASDAQ small cap Retail  OFC NYSE Industrial and Office 
CDX NYSE Industrial and Office  OHI NYSE Health Care 
CEI NYSE Diversified  OLP NYSE Diversified 
CLI NYSE Industrial and Office  PCL NYSE Specialty 
CLP NYSE Diversified  PEI NYSE Retail 
CNT NYSE Industrial and Office  PGE NYSE Industrial and Office 
CPG NYSE Retail  PKY NYSE Industrial and Office 
CPT NYSE Residential  PLD NYSE Industrial and Office 
 ii 
 
Appendix (A) (Continuous)   REITs Sample  
Ticker Exchange Type   Ticker Exchange Type 
CPV NYSE Specialty  PNP NYSE Retail 
CRE NYSE Industrial and Office  PP NYSE Industrial and Office 
CRLTS NASDAQ small cap Residential  PPS NYSE Residential 
CUZ NYSE Diversified  PSA NYSE Self Storage 
DDR NYSE Retail  PSB AMEX Industrial and Office 
DRE NYSE Industrial and Office  RA NYSE Industrial and Office 
EGP NYSE Industrial and Office  REG NYSE Retail 
ENN NYSE Lodging and Resorts  RPT NYSE Retail 
EOP NYSE Industrial and Office  RSE NYSE Retail 
EPR NYSE Specialty  RYN NYSE Specialty 
EQR NYSE Residential  SHU NYSE Self Storage 
EQY NYSE Retail  SKT NYSE Retail 
ESS NYSE Residential  SLG NYSE Industrial and Office 
FCE.A NYSE Diversified  SMT NYSE Residential 
FCH NYSE Lodging and Resorts  SNH NYSE Health Care 
FPO NYSE Industrial and Office  SPG NYSE Retail 
FR NYSE Industrial and Office  SSS NYSE Self Storage 
FREVS.OB OTC Diversified  SUI NYSE Residential 
FRT NYSE Retail  TCO NYSE Retail 
FUR NYSE Diversified  TCR NYSE Residential 
GBP NYSE Residential  TCT NYSE Residential 
GE NYSE Diversified  TRZ NYSE Industrial and Office 
GGP NYSE Retail  UBA NYSE Retail 
GLB NYSE Industrial and Office  UDR NYSE Residential 
GPP NYSE   UHT NYSE Health Care 
GRT NYSE Retail  UMH NYSE Residential 
GSL NYSE Specialty  VNO NYSE Diversified 
HCN NYSE Health Care  VTR NYSE Health Care 
HCP NYSE Health Care  WPC NYSE Industrial and Office 
HIH NYSE Lodging and Resorts  WRE NYSE Diversified 
HIW NYSE Industrial and Office  WRI NYSE Retail 
HME NYSE Residential  WRS NYSE Health Care 
HMT NYSE Lodging and Resorts  WXH NYSE Lodging and Resorts 
HOT NYSE Lodging and Resorts         
 iii 
 
Appendix (B)   REITs Property Types  
 
 
Property Type    Number Percentage 
Diversified 12 8.89% 
Health Care 8 5.93% 
Industrial and Office 36 26.67% 
Lodging and Resorts 13 9.63% 
Residential 25 18.52% 
Retail 31 22.96% 
Self Storage 3 2.22% 
Specialty 7 5.19% 
 
 
 
 
